Security Issues in Public Recreation Centers

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An integral component of an effective risk management plan is the inclusion of security policies and procedures. Security issues must be considered when developing a risk management plan since the recreation facility director must be able to identify risks that could conceivably cause losses and jeopardize the safety of the staff, patrons, and property (Miller & Veltri, 2001). Effective security policies and procedures require a balance between the risks to the agency and costs to preserve or protect a particular asset (Cawood, 2002). Central to determining this balance, a recreation facility director should develop a risk management plan. This risk management plan should include an analysis of all the assets to be protected, how an asset could be lost or damaged, the probability of each loss type, the cost to the company (Cooper, 2002).

Whereas risk management plans help to ensure the protection of recreation agencies by supplying a structure for managers in finance, security, and human resources, security policies describe the intent of the company in a given area and security procedures satisfy the objectives of the security policy by making the intent of the policies concrete (Cawood, 2002). A risk management plan provides a framework while security plans and procedures provide a "road map" for the implementation and conduction of the risk management plan.

The most obvious application of security is for the protection of the company's physical assets (Coletta, 2002). Potential risks that recreation agencies may encounter include: (1) property loss or damage (e.g., facility/equipment and vandalism), (2) non-negligent public liability (e.g., discrimination, product liability, employee actions, and criminal incidents). (3) business operations (e.g., potential financial losses), and (4) negligent public liability (e.g., bodily injury and organization or employee services)

(Appenzeller, 1998; van der Smissen, 1990). Thus, the recreation director should consider the assets not only in economic but human resource terms.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

While some research has been done to assess and examine security as it relates to campus recreation center security (Veltri, Miller, & Scott, 2001; Miller & Veltri, 2001) little research has been done to assess and examine security in recreation centers in general, nor has thought been given to the role of security systems in public recreation center's risk management plans. Therefore, the purposes of this study were to: a) examine the security procedures and policies at public recreation facilities; b) identify the most common types of criminal activity occurring at public recreation facilities; c) investigate the usage of close-circuit television cameras as security tools at public recreation facilities; and d) the effects of facility design on security at public recreation facilities.

METHODOLOGY

Instrument

A modified version of the Miller and Veltri questionnaire (2001) was used in the present study to reflect public recreation facilities rather than university campus recreation centers. The answers to the questionnaire were primarily of nominal items (i.e., yes/no responses). The questionnaire consisted of six sections related to the following: 1) individual and facility background information; 2) security plan policies and procedures 3) staff policies and training procedures; 4) criminal activity issues; 5) close-circuit television usage; and 6) facility design issues.

Due to the shift of the surveyed population and additional items added to the Miller and Veltri (2001) instrument, content reliability procedures were addressed. In order to ensure the reliability of the questionnaire, a test-retest protocol was followed. The researchers asked 3 recreation facility administrators in each of their respective localities to complete the questionnaire. The retest was accomplished 2 weeks later by the same group of individuals. To determine the test-retest reliability of the instrument, the researchers employed a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (Pearson's r). The reliability coefficient was determined to be .92, which is well within the acceptable range for the interpretation of scores for individuals (Patten, 2000).

Data Collection

The researchers attended 2 national and 2 state recreation conferences to collect the data. At the completion of risk management sessions at each of the respective conferences, the researchers explained the purpose of the study and asked the attendees to voluntarily complete the questionnaire. A total of 51 attendees completed the questionnaire.

The breakdown of the conferences the respondents attended was as follows: 25 (49%) the University of Georgia Parks and Recreation Conference, 11 (21%) the National Parks and Recreation Conference, 10 (20%) the Georgia State Parks and Recreation Association Conference, and 5 (10%) the Athletic Business Conference. It should be noted that although the majority of respondents were from the state of Georgia, 24 (47%) represented other states.

FINDINGS

Demographic Information

In regard to the professional positions of the respondents, all 51 of the respondents held facility administrative or supervisory roles within each of their respective recreation departments. Twenty-six (51%) of these individuals indicated that they had held these positions for 1-10 years, while 17 (33%) reported that they had held these positions for 11-20 years.

The respondents were also asked to describe their recreation departments. Forty-three administrators (86%) indicated that their recreation department was public, 5 (10%) were private departments, 2 (4%) were non-profit. Finally, twenty-one (41%) indicated that their recreation department was located in a suburban area, 16 (39%) revealed they were in an urban area, while only 10 (20%) reported to be located in a rural community (see Table 1).

TABLE 1

Demographic and Program Information	Number (percentages)
Hold a facility administrative or supervisory role *(a)*	
Yes	51 (100%)
No	0 (0%)
Length in position *(a)*	
1-10 years	26 (51%)
11-20 years	17 (33%)
21-30 years	8 (16%)
Recreation department description *(a)*	
Public	43(86%)
Private	5 (10%)
Other	2 (4%)
Location of facility *(a)*	
Suburban	21 (41%)
Urban	16 (39%)
Rural	10 (20%)

(a) n=51

Security Policies and Procedures

Most (66%) of the administrators reported that, in the last year, they felt the focus on security of patrons had increased. This would seem to be substantiated by the majority (63%) of the subjects indicating that their recreation department possessed a written risk management manual. Risk management plans were defined in this investigation as strategies that methodically identify unreasonable risky situations to which the patrons may be exposed.

When asked if their recreation department possessed a security plan, 31 (61%) responded negatively. Of the 20 who indicated that their department did have a security plan, 13 (65%) responded that it was not part of the overall risk management plan for the department. Thus, only 25% of the population surveyed included a security plan within the overall risk management plan of the organization. It should be noted that a security plan was defined to the

respondents as actively providing the patrons and their property with appropriate security measures in order to provide a safe environment, both verbally and in written form. It is interesting to note that all of the administrators responded when asked if they were satisfied with their security system. Eight (16%) felt their security system needed improvement, 41 (80%) believed it to be adequate or satisfactory, and 2 (4%) indicated that security plan was excellent. Additionally, of respondents who maintained a security plan, 7 (80%) revealed that it had been updated in the past 6-12 months. Thus, it may be inferred that while the majority of the respondents indicated they possessed a written risk management plan they did not incorporate security procedures within it.

While 18 (37%) of the respondents indicated that they did not have a security plan in place as a normal routine, it is interesting to note that 26 (51%) of the entire subject population reported that their recreation department modified its security plan for different types of events. Although it is often necessary due to the unusual or uncommon characteristics of an event, alterations for each individual event may frequently lead to confusion in implementing an effective risk management and security plan. Thus, it appears that security plans involving recreation activities are not considered important on a daily basis and are only implemented when there is a perceived need rather than a normal departmental practice. This eventually can lead to potentially dire results for the organization's reputation as well as its budget if litigation were to occur.

The majority of respondents (56%) indicated that even in light of recent national events they had not been able to change anything about their modified or routine security plans. The remaining 12 (44%) were asked to identify all of the recent modifications that applied to their security plans. Therefore, it should be noted that the numbers and percentages will reflect multiple answers from each respondent. Eight (75%) of the 12 respondents revealed that their facility had updated the alarm system. Six (50%) had placed restrictions on shipment delivery areas while six (50%) responded that the organization had increased the likelihood of an individual receiving a summons for parking violations. Five (42%) of the administrators reported an increased the amount of security equipment for use in the recreation facility. Four (33%) of the respondents revealed that their organization had increased the number of staff security training sessions. Two (17%) reported that they had removed excessive vegetation and plants near the facility that may be used as cover for a perpetrator. Interestingly, one (8%) administrator reported that their organization had developed an anti-terrorist plan as a modification to their security system in light of the events of 9/11.

TABLE 2

Security Plan Policies and Procedures	*Number (percentages)*
Increased patron security *(a)*	
Yes	34 (66%)
No	17 (33%)
Possess written risk management plan *(a)*	
Yes	33 (63%)
No	18 (37%)
Possess security policies and procedures *(a)*	
Yes	20 (39%)
No	31 (61%)
Security policies and procedures part of the overall risk management plan *(b)*	
Yes	7 (35%)
No	13 (65%)
Security plan updated in the past 6 months? *(b)*	
Yes	16 (80%)
No	4 (20%)
Level of security policies and procedures satisfaction *(a)*	
Security plan is excellent	2 (4%)
Security plan is satisfactory	41 (80%)
Security plan needs improvement	8 (16%)
Modify security plans for different types of events? *(a)*	
Yes	26 (51%)
No	25 (49%)
Change in modified security system in the light of recent events, i.e., 9/11? *(c)*	
Yes	12 (44%)
No	14 (56%)

Modifications made (Identify all that apply) *(d)*	
Updated alarm system	8 (75%)
Restricted UPS shipment delivery area	6 (50%)
Increased summons for parking violations	6 (50%)
Increased security equipment	5 (42%)
Increased number staff security training sessions	4 (33%)
Removed excess vegetation and plants	2 (17%)
Developed an anti-terrorist plan	1 (8%)

(a) n=51
(b) n=12
(c) n=26
(d) n=20

Staff Policies and Training

While 29 (57%) of administrators stated that their organizational policies do not require a supervisor or manager to be on duty in the facility at all times, it falls short of the expected 100% of the time. It would have been interesting to inquire as to who would be on duty in the absence of the supervisor or manager.

A cost efficient and effective avenue for providing security is appropriate personnel identification. To that end, 36 (71%) of the administrators indicated that the people in their organization were required to wear shirts identifying them as staff of the facility; however, only slightly more than one-third of the respondents (35%) required to staff members to wear nametags or other types of identification. Therefore, while a staff member may be identified through the affiliation to the facility, a patron may not know their names that could lead to confusion in case of an emergency. However, as described in the following paragraph, simple identification does not necessarily mean that the staff member is equipped to respond to emergencies.

The data analyzed revealed that slightly more than half of the administrators required their staff to be certified in any type of basic First Aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Thirty-two (63%) of the administrators disclosed that they did conduct lifesaving and/or security training sessions for their personnel. Twenty-six (51%) of the administrators disclosed that they did conduct lifesaving and/or security training sessions for their personnel. When those 26 administrators were further queried as to how often the staff in their organization were reacquainted with basic lifesaving and/or security techniques, 3 (11%) carried out in-service training every

month, 8 (31%) offered one every 6 months, and 7 (27%) conducted one every year. Alarmingly, 8 (31%) indicated that the only time basic lifesaving and/or security techniques were discussed with the staff was when an individual was initially hired.

It is disturbing to the authors that only 5 (10%) of the respondents indicated that the recreation staff had an on-site automatic external defibrillator (AED). Cost was the number one response for not having an AED available on-site. Thus, while all of the administrators indicated that they provide retraining of their staff at least once per year, the majority do not require their staff to possess any basic or advanced lifesaving certifications or make available potentially lifesaving items.

TABLE 3

Staff Policies and Training	Number (percentages)
Supervisor/manager on duty at all times *(a)*	
Yes	29 (57%)
No	22 (43%)
Staff members required to wear staff shirts *(a)*	
Yes	29 (57%)
No	22 (43%)
Staff members required to wear nametags or IDs *(a)*	
Yes	18 (35%)
No	33 (65%)
Staff members required to be certified in CPR First Aid *(a)*	
Yes	26 (51%)
No	25 (49%)
Staff access to an on-site AED *(a)*	
Yes	26 (51%)
No	25 (49%)
Training sessions for personnel on security issues *(a)*	
Yes	26 (51%)
No	25 (49%)

Interval of training sessions offered *(b)*	
One per month	3 (11%)
One per 6 months	8 (31%)
One per year	7 (27%)
Only when the person is hired	8 (31%)

(a) n=51
(b) n=26

Criminal Activity

The respondents were asked to identify all of the types of criminal activities that occurred in their recreation centers within the past year. Thus, it should be noted that the investigators asked the respondents to identify all of the types of criminal activities that occurred and the numbers as well as the percentages will reflect multiple answers from each respondent. Theft and vandalism were cited as the most frequent types of criminal activity by 32 of the recreation administrators. Fights (25), illegal entries (14), and employee theft (14) rounded out the top criminal activities identified by the respondents (see Table 4).

TABLE 4

Most Common Type of Incident(s) (Identify all that apply)	Last Year Number (percentages)
Vandalism	32 (63%)
Theft	32 (63%)
Fights	25 (49%)
Illegal entries	14 (27%)
Employee theft	10 (20%)
Other	4 (8%)

In regards to the number of criminal incidents, illegal entry was by far the leader with 3003. One administrator revealed 2000 illegal entrances to the facility in the past year. Additionally, two other individuals reported 300, 3 more indicated between 101-299, and 5 more revealed between 51-100 illegal entrances to their recreation facilities within the past year. For the purposes of this investigation illegal entries were defined as the entrance into the facility by individuals who were not members of the agency or had not received permission of the agency to be in the facility. Of the other 4 criminal activities most often cited by the recreation administrators there were 1344 occurrences of vandalism, 834 incidents of theft, 526 fights, and 28 reports of employee theft at their recreation facility within the past year (see Table 5).

TABLE 5

Approximate Number of Incidents of Criminal Activity in the Last Year

Incident	1-50	51-100	101-200	201-300	301-499	500-999	1000+	Total
Illegal entry	6	5	0	2	0	0	1	3003
Vandalism	31	0	1	0	0	1	0	1344
Theft	31	1	0	0	0	0	0	834
Fights	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	526
Employee theft	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	28

Close-Circuit Television Usage

Close-circuit television allows a facility to monitor many areas of concern from a central location. Thirty-five respondents (69%) indicated that they did not have close-circuit television (CCTV) in their facility. Of the 16 that did have CCTVs, 11 (69%) reported using 2 to 12 CCTVs. The location and number of cameras in facility areas, as reported in Table 6 indicated that most of the facilities had CCTVs in the lobby, while other areas such as aerobic rooms, weight rooms, outside parking, locker room entrance, pool, aerobic room, and entrance areas each were cited as other important areas.

When asked to identify routine uses of their CCTV cameras, the 16 respondents indicated that they changed the location or angles of the cameras regularly and 9 (56%) reported using a 24-hour recording of CCTV cameras, however, only 3 (19%) monitored the CCTV camera system outside the facility very well. Security measures provided by dummy CCTV cameras were utilized at 3 of the recreation facilities. Dummy closed-circuit television cameras are used to decoy any potential aggressors into thinking that the area is being monitored.

It should be noted that the investigators asked the respondents to cite all applicable answers when addressing the reasons, locations, and routines for 16 respondents who used close-circuit television cameras (CCTV). Thus, the numbers and percentages will reflect multiple answers from each respondent. Monitoring the activities of individuals in the facility was cited as the primary reason for using closed-circuit television cameras by 13 (81%) of the 16 respondents. Eleven (69%) of the 16 respondents indicated that the closed-circuit television cameras were used to protect the patrons. Also, eleven (69%) of the 16 respondents who used close-circuit television cameras reported to do so to deter criminal acts. The administrators indicated several reasons such as financial (46%), no need (23%), limited acts of criminal activity (17%), appearance (9%), and expectation from patrons (6%) for not having CCTV cameras in their facility.

TABLE 6

Close-Circuit Television Cameras Usage	Number (percentages)
Use close-circuit televisions cameras *(a)*	
Yes	16 (31%)
No	35 (69%)
Number used *(b)*	
1-12	11 (69%)
13-24	4 (25%)
25 or more	1 (6%)
Reasons for CCTVs (Identify all that apply) *(b)*	
Monitor patron activity	13 (81%)
Protect patrons	11 (69%)
Deter criminal acts	11 (69%)
Other	2 (12)

CCTVs location (Identify all that apply) *(b)*	
Lobby	10 (63%)
Weight room	8 (50%)
Outside parking lot	7 (44%)
Locker room entrance	5 (31%)
Pool	4 (25%)
Aerobic room	3 (19%)
CCTV routines (Identify all that apply) *(b)*	
Change location regularly	11 (69%)
Change angle of camera regularly	11 (69%)
Use 24-hour recordings	9 (56%)
Individual monitoring CCTV	3 (19%)
Reasons against CCTVs *(c)*	
Financial (too expensive)	16 (46%)
No need	8 (23%)
Limited acts of criminal activity	6 (17%)
Appearance	3 (9%)
Not expected from patrons	2 (2%)
Use "dummy", i.e. fake, CCTVs ? *(a)*	
Yes	3 (5%)
No	48 (95%)

(a) n=51
(b) n=16
(c) n=35

Facility Design Issues

Facility design is an extremely important, though often overlooked consideration for effective security. Thirty-seven (72%) felt that their facility was not designed with security in mind. These administrators were asked to further identify all examples in which security issues were not foremost in the facility design. It should be noted, for the following information, that the investigators asked the respondents to cite all applicable answers when addressing the reasons, locations, and routines for 16 respondents who used

close-circuit television cameras. Thus, the numbers and percentages will reflect the multiple answers given by each respondent. The lack of panic/alarm buttons behind the reception desk was cited by 32 (88%) of the 37 responding administrators as the most common design element that was overlooked. The second most common facility design flaw reported by 23 (61%) of the subjects was improper outside lighting of the facility. The third and fourth most frequent design issues were angled corridors and deeply recessed walls that were indicated by 22 (59%) and the inability to supervise all of the entrances by 17 (45%) of the respondents. The final two most common security facility design errors that were identified by the administrators were the close proximity to major thoroughfare by 16 (43%) and the size and close proximity of vegetative growth to the recreation facility by 10 (26%).

The majority of facilities used some form of access control. Eighteen (35%) respondents indicated that they used a staff member to check identification cards, 14 (27%) employed an identification card reader, 9 (18%)% used a computerized identification card check, 4 (8%) operated turnstiles to check identification while 6 (12)% utilized a combination of the aforementioned as well as other forms of patron access control. Other forms of patron access control include honor and staffed fee collection at entrance area, instructors checking registration, locked door-buzzer activated by staff, manual check-in, facility entrance booth, permits and sign-in sheets.

Finally, more than half of the respondents (55%) indicated that their facilities were not equipped with security alarming systems for all non-supervised doors. When the 28 administrators were further asked to explain reasons for this occurrence, 23 (84%) indicated that all non-supervised doors were always locked, 19 (68%) reported no perceived need, and 11 (41%) identified cost as a factor.

TABLE 7

Facility Design Security Issues	Number (percentages)
Facility designed for security *(a)*	
Yes	14 (28%)
No	37 (72%)
Identified examples (cite all that apply) *(b)*	
Lack of panic/alarm button behind reception desk	32 (88%)
Improper outside lighting	23 (61%)
Angled corridors	22 (59%)

Deeply recessed walls	22 (59%)
Lack of supervision capability of entrances	17 (45%)
Proximity (closeness) to major roads/streets	16 (43%)
Bushes/vegetation area too close or not well lit	10 (26%)

(a) n=51
(b) n=37

TABLE 8

Access Control	Number (percentages)
Access control used *(a)*	
Yes	46 (90%)
No	5 (10%)
Type(s) of access control used *(b)*	
Staff member	18 (35%)
ID card reader	14 (27%)
Turnstiles	4 (8%)
Combination	6 (12%)
Other	4 (8%)
Non-supervised entrances possess alarm system *(a)*	
Yes	23 (45%)
No	28 (55%)
Reason(s) for not having alarm system for non-supervised entrances (list all that apply) *(c)*	
All non-supervised entrances are always locked	23 (84%)
No perceived need	19 (68%)
Cost (too expensive)	11 (41%)
Other	9 (32%)

(a) n=51
(b) n=46
(c) n=28

DISCUSSION

It is curious that results show that more administrators were satisfied with their security plan than those who indicated that they possessed one. Several reasons may account for this. First, the administrators may perceive that risk management plans and security plans are one in the same. However, this is negated by the fact that 19 individuals responded that they had a risk management plan at their recreation department. A second reason may be that the administrators do not fully comprehend the concept of appropriate security measures in order to provide a safe environment for the patrons. However, after verbally defining security the researchers specifically asked if any of the respondents had any questions about that particular question and not one of them did. The recreation administrator must understand that the risk management process is more extensive than the purchase of insurance and subsequently, the processing claims process. For the risk management process to be effective there should be regular educational and training opportunities for all the individuals in the organization.

In regards to staff training, Miller and Veltri (2001) stated that people and procedures are the two primary security components that need to be addressed in a facility. People that need to be considered in a security plan include administration personnel, staff and maintenance personnel, student workers, volunteers, participants, and visitors. In fact, many organizations are focusing more and more on the segment of risk control (i.e., employee and third-party safety, property protection, emergency preparedness, and contract stipulations) as the principal method for reducing both the frequency and severity of losses over the long term (Cawood, 2002).

Security should be a never-ending process. It should be analyzed and evaluated on a daily basis. Therefore, it is somewhat disconcerting that in one-third of the time the only instance security or basic lifesaving techniques were discussed at all was when an individual was first hired. While offering in-service training at least once per year is somewhat laudable, not requiring basic lifesaving skills at the beginning of employment begs the question: who is responsible if a person is hired between retraining sessions and does not have any lifesaving certifications? This is significantly compounded since slightly more that 30% provided appropriate training once annually. Thus, it is quite likely that an individual may be employed in a recreation facility for a year and not receive any training session at which security protocols are discussed.

Security programs and attendant hardware, at any level of application, are meant to first redirect someone from doing a dangerous or injurious act

(Cawood, 2002). If the distraction is not unsuccessful, they then halt the advancement of the individual committing the undesirable action until qualified individuals can be notified and respond to handle the problem (Cooper, 2002). All effective security programs work under the postulation that, at any level of problem, properly trained personnel will respond.

To this point it was troubling to the authors to find that only 10% of the population indicated that an on-site automatic external defibrillator (AED) was available in their recreation areas. Unfortunately, this finding contests the assertion by Connaughton and Spengler (2001) who revealed that there has been a significant increase of the installation of AED's in recreational facilities. The likelihood of cardiac arrests happening in sport and recreational settings has been well chronicled (Cantwell, 1998), making the availability of an AED important not only for the protection of the participants but also officials, coaches, or spectators who may be susceptible to cardiac arrest while attending a recreational event. This is especially true when it has been reported that about a quarter of the population in America have some form of cardiovascular disease, which are responsible for causing approximately 500,000 fatal heart attacks annually (Aufderheide, 1998).

Perhaps the results of *Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club* (2002) illustrate a potential rationale as to why recreation administrators in the study did not have automatic external defibrillators available to the staff. In *Atcovitz* the court found that the club did not hold to a duty of care to a patron who incurred a stroke on the premises, to purchase and maintain an AED (p. 1224). Thus, according to *Atcovitz*, many of the administrators may unknowingly heed this judgment and be well within their legal rights.

While the cost of an AED was cited as the primary reason for not having one, how might that compare to cost of saving a patron's life? A study conducted in areas of highest incidence of cardiac arrests, including sports arenas and recreation areas, determined that placing 276 AED's would have provided appropriate treatment for 134 cardiac victims, of which between 8 and 32 lives may have been saved, over a 5 year period (Becker, et. al., 1998). It is important for the recreation administrator to understand that external defibrillator legislative provisions allow for some protection for recreation practitioners (Connaughton & Spengler, 2001)). Though these provisions vary in breadth and scope by state, the majority of them necessitate that an AED be used to the best of an individual's ability during an emergency situation (Connaughton & Spengler).

The respondents indicated that illegal entries were the most identified criminal incidents supporting the findings of earlier investigations (Miller & Veltri, 2001; Veltri, et. al. 2001; Watkins-Miller, 1999). The recreation

administrator should recognize the court findings in *Holder v. Mellon* (1997) and *Montes v. Indian Cliffs Ranch, Inc,* (1997) in which the courts determined that although an owner or occupier is not considered an insurer of the safety of his or her invitees, a duty does exist to use reasonable care to protect the patrons from foreseeable injuries. The owner or occupier also must protect patrons against dangerous conditions on the premises of which there is actual or constructive knowledge, and is required to keep the property reasonably safe (Dobbs, 2000). Even if employees do not report the presence of an intruder, the court may find the organization legally responsible and not immune from litigation.

The case of *S.W. v. Spring Lake School District* (1997) is of particular relevance to this investigation as it centers on security policies of a public organization. The school district conceded that it had no security policy, but argued that its decision to have no policy still provides immunity from litigation. However, the Court of Appeals stated that the fact that the school district simply decided not to have a security policy is not the type of decision-making that should be protected by statutory immunity (p. 372). Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the district's decision not to have a security policy was not a discretionary decision that entitled it to statutory immunity (p. 372). Therefore, the investigators suggest that public recreation directors need to be aware of the lack of immunity that the courts may provide if their organization does not to adopt or properly communicate a security policy.

The courts have found that an organization is liable for a breach of an implied contract to maintain existing security measures in cases in which an individual suffered injuries due to an attack of a third party on the premises (*Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson, 1999, Hayden v. University of Notre, 1999; United States v. Patrick, 1990*). Thus, as it appears in several of the responses that illegal entry is common (200-2000 per year) to their facility, the recreation administrator must foresee that an illegal entrant may be responsible for an attack (i.e., assault or rape) on a patron. Especially in the aforementioned situations the organization needs to be particularly vigilant in maintaining their duty to their patrons.

Vandalism and theft were identified as the second and third most encountered criminal activity. Vandalism and graffiti at parks, pools, buildings, playgrounds, golf courses and nature areas costs recreation departments thousands of dollars annually to repair. For example, vandals recently damaged a recreation golf course in Chicago after stealing tools from a city owned shed and then driving three city-owned recreation department vehicles into a pond (Haschak, 2003). Incidences such as this may result in not only having damaged recreation equipment, landscapes and defaced

facilities but also potentially preventing the recreation organization from offering activities or providing a safe place to conduct them.

Breaking into lockers and stealing apparel may occur when there is a lack of supervision within a facility. This is particularly true if the recreation facility has experienced a large number of illegal entries and employees do not know who is on the premises, as indicated by several of the respondents. While an illegal entrant may be considered a trespasser to whom the recreation organization does not owe a duty of reasonable care, the duty to the patron does include protection from negligent behavior created by a third party (Maloy, 2001; Wong, 2001; Dobbs, 2000).

The results also indicated that one third of the facilities used close-circuit televisions (CCTVs). While those who feel that CCTVs infringe on their privacy can still oppose close-circuit television cameras, their proliferation in grocery stores, banks, and gas stations, has allowed CCTVs to become more accepted as a part of society (Kennedy, 2002). When using CCTVs, risk managers must carefully decide the location and number of cameras, when and how to change camera angles, and the frequency and duration of recording. The primary reasons for using CCTVs (i.e., monitoring patrons, protecting patrons, and deterring criminal acts) can help to make these decisions.

Closed circuit television (CCTV) technology is often used without proper planning or thought. Having the presence of CCTV cameras can be a perceptual security enhancement in certain areas (Rosenberg, 2000). It is most effective when used to record images of incidents in progress for later analysis. It is less effective when deployed to provide a real-time oversight of security areas. In some facilities the number of cameras being utilized outweighs the ability for human operators to observe the actions being recorded (Reid, 2002). Even with the use of motion-activated or alarm monitoring only, a human operator can only effectively monitor about 10 cameras for 15 minutes without taking a break (Cawood, 2002). Another complexity regarding CCTV use is when cameras consistently pan a large area. While ideally this practice was designed to increase the area covered, in reality it reduces efficient usage since the camera may be out of position when something is actually occurring.

Very few respondents reported using dummy CCTVs. While employing fake CCTVs may be a lower cost alternative to consider, it may prove to be a mistake that could lead to litigation. For example, rapes, robberies, and assaults have occurred on sites with fake cameras and the victims have successfully sued for damages. The suits hinged on the idea that the organization knew there might have been security problems because they installed the cameras. Thus, organizations have compounded the problem by

having the victim believe that the cameras protect them when no one has actually responded to help them (*Butera v. Cottey,* 2002; *Storts v. Hardee's Food Systems*, 2000). As a result, the bogus cameras did not hinder the crimes from being committed, instead they seemed to increase the litigious exposure of the organization. Additionally, the recreation administrator should understand and communicate to the staff how CCTV systems may be used as a preventative measure, not just as a record that a crime has been committed. A full complement of cameras should allow staff to monitor a potential problem area throughout the public areas of the facilities (Harris, 2002).

While surveillance devices are important in enhancing security, designing a secure environment begins with effective facility design (Kennedy, 2002). Designing facilities with security in mind is a proactive method of eliminating potential risks. Security often is thought of in terms of systems and devices such as those previously mentioned—access control and identification, intrusion detection and alarm systems, and closed-circuit television. The recreation administrator needs to understand that there are two different kinds of security: active and passive. Active security would encompass those systems associated with hardware and wiring, whether it's card swipes or cameras (Cawood, 2002). Passive security is about how you design a building to be a secure environment (Cawood). Knowing the unique distinctiveness and challenges of a facility will determine the kind of security required.

In this study less than one-third of respondents indicated that they considered security issues during the building of the facility. This signifies that the overwhelming majority of the administrators in the study must address risk management and security issues post hoc. This can be more expensive and reflects badly on the organization when crews have to work in areas often utilized by patrons. This after the fact inconvenience could convince the patron to drop their membership thereby causing a loss of income to the recreation facility.

Designing a recreation facility should not be a burden on the organization's budget. Miller and Veltri (2001) noted that security measures used by recreation centers depend on the type and size of facility, the location of the facility as well as practical considerations such as appearance, function, and cost. Some elements of the typical facility design create anxiety and heighten the potential for conflict (Young, 2003). These elements include narrow, crowded hallways that create threatening environments with the potential to lead to hostile interactions, and large locker bays where hostilities can take place largely unobserved. By eliminating narrow passages, hard turns and hard-to-supervise areas, there can be a removal of an environment that creates a threat of entrapment or isolation (Young). Additionally, the

recreation facility director should also consider proper lighting within the facility design.

Although appropriate lighting may be used for the effective security purposes of a facility (Cawood, 2002), over 60% of the population identified that their facility had improper outside lighting. These decisions should always be made in recognition that standards are beginning to emerge, both in litigation and in practice. LaRue and Sawyer (2002) describe the importance of effective lighting in and around recreational facilities as well as detailing standards for the average level of light for such locations as walkways, parking lots, the exterior of the buildings, the interior of various parts of the facility, and roadways. Not considering these standards will not only increase the probability of loss, but also the exposure to potential litigation that may follow.

Access-control is another important design condition to address. Patton (1997) suggested that the number of access points in a recreation facility be minimal (as long as they meet building code requirements), have easy flow, and always have a security alarm system for non-supervised exits and entrances. Access-control can range from high technological methods, such as computerized identification card checks, to manual access control. To neutralize any such incidents from occurring, the organization should have an access-control system included in the design plan.

Cost and staffing issues will be major determinants of the type of access-control that recreation facilities use (Coletta, 2002). Perhaps this may explain why, although all of the administrators indicated that their facility had some type of access-control, there seemed to an unusually large number of illegal entrants in several cases. Access-control should be a security procedure topic that an administrator communicates to their employees more than once or twice per year.

An additional design concern is the inclusion of alarm systems. Alarm systems are meant to alert designated personnel to a condition being monitored (Coletta, 2002), yet 55% of the respondents indicated that they did not have alarm systems at non-supervised entrances. Security alarm systems can be used in a variety of ways depending on the level of security needed. An effective security alarm system should be monitored by personnel who will either respond or send response elements (police or security enforcement) to the scene for verification. All points of entry such as doors and windows, especially if unsupervised, should have an alarm system intact and checked on a daily basis. The alarm system should be monitored at a central location and directly at the location of the alarm, in the case of an emergency, should be clearly marked so no one has to remember what is the physical location for the

response (Coletta, 2002). The facility should always provide adequate battery backup for the alarm system. A minimum of 24 hours of battery power should be built into the system in case of intentional or unintentional power loss (Cawood, 2002). This last statement would have particular security relevance to the blackout that occurred in the United States in the summer of 2003. For example, if another blackout occurred and inadequate battery back up of an alarm system was available, the recreation agencies could find themselves in a precarious position in providing for the safety of its patrons.

CONCLUSION

From the results of this investigation it is apparent that although the majority of respondents indicated the focus on security for patrons has increased, actual security practices are not being effectively implemented or managed. Specifically, the number of illegal entrants, fights, vandalism, lack of continuous supervision, deficient training regarding security issues and lifesaving techniques, and lack of an alarm system for non-supervised entrances, all may be related to the absence of security plans found in the majority of recreation facilities in the study. Additionally, the majority of respondents indicated that their facility was not designed with security as a priority. These aspects, in combination with 80% of the respondents revealing that they were satisfied with their security plans, lead the investigators to believe that the administrators do not have an appreciation of the importance of implementing security plans and procedures.

Security threats are major matters that can be effectively managed with forethought and preparation, therefore, a recreational organization should construct security policies and procedures that are suitable for its specific environment. Reducing a facility's likelihood of security breaches may significantly safeguard an organization's financial bottom line as well as its' employees, patrons, and property. The ultimate success of any effective risk management plan and the accompanying security policies and procedures depend on the acceptance of a clear vision by recreation facility administrators to provide patron safety. Security may be accomplished through the proactive linking of many different control, monitoring and response systems that, collectively, provide protection for the organization and patrons. Strong commitment and communication with the staff in implementing and enforcing security policies and procedures can make participation in public recreation activities enjoyable and safe.

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